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Building Bombs, Building a Nation: The State, *Chaebŏl*, and the Militarized Industrialization of South Korea, 1973–1979

PETER BANSEOK KWON

In response to US plans to withdraw troops from South Korea in the 1970s, the Park Chung Hee administration (1961–79) leveraged all defense-related civilian industries to build an independent system of weapons production. In keeping with Park's advancement of military modernization driven by strong private-sector growth, an agenda that he promoted with his banner slogan "rich nation, strong military," large Korean companies known as chaebŏl *were transformed to serve as government contractors that drove both national economic development and military modernization. A case study of one such company, Hanwha, illustrates how the state's hyper-militarization of Korean industries determined the distinct course and character of South Korea's national development. The study highlights the dynamic interplay that occurred between state actors and private-sector CEOs, managers, and laborers in shaping the* chaebŏl*-centered economic and defense industrialization.*

Keywords: *chaebŏl*, defense industry, developmental state, economic development, Hanwha, Korea, militarism, military modernization, Park Chung Hee

Existing literature on the Park Chung Hee era (1961–79) has not yet assessed the degree to which defense industry policies shaped the *chaebŏl* (Korean family-owned conglomerates) and their emergence as leading industrializers of South Korea's economy. To explain the development of *chaebŏl*, previous studies have focused on the role of US economic and military aid to South Korea during the Vietnam War in the 1960s (Glassman and Choi 2014; Woo 1991). Yet a growing literature further recognizes how a particularly "Korean-style" development occurred, influenced by internal factors, as the Park regime, by means of the authoritarian Yusin system (1972–79), forged alliances with the *chaebŏl* while grooming them as industrial partners (E. Kim and Park 2011; H. Kim 2004; O 2009). Some studies have proposed that a militarized development model served as a blueprint for the Park state to engineer rapid industrialization (Eckert 2016; Han 2016; S. Moon 2005).

In line with these studies, and drawing from the latest government and civilian sources to be made available on the ROK defense industry in the 1970s, this article examines how the Park regime's heavy and chemical industrialization (HCI) policies of

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1973–79 promoted the *chaebŏl* as they became drivers of a military-industrial buildup.[1] The discussion here addresses the following questions: What state strategies in the 1970s influenced the transformation of the *chaebŏl* as they expanded their operations from manufacturing in light industries to contracting with the state as national arms suppliers and HCI conglomerates? How did the *chaebŏl* themselves respond to Park's agenda for "rich nation, strong military"? Finally, how is the example of Korean economic development to be distinguished from other models of development in East Asia?

A "developmental state" model is often referenced to explain the economic rise of postwar Japan and the newly industrialized countries (NICs) in Asia, including South Korea (Amsden 1989; Evans 1995; Johnson 1982; Woo-Cumings 1999).[2] A more refined distillation of the Korean narrative should treat it as a variant example of the conventional model, based on the distinctive ways in which military-driven industrialization shaped South Korea's postwar economic development. Following on the Park regime's initiatives to promote civilian-based arms manufacturing beginning in the late 1960s, the *Chunghwahak kongŏphwa chŏngch'aek* (Heavy and Chemical Industrialization Plan or HCIP; 1973–79) was developed as an all-out, public-private cooperative effort to produce weapons. The Military Procurement Law of 1973 supplied the legal measures by which the state militarized, mobilized, and modernized the *chaebŏl* as arms producers within the HCI framework. As a result of these initiatives and the *chaebŏl* responses to them in the 1970s, unprecedented and parallel commercial and defense modernization accelerated ROK development and determined the course of a distinctly Korean "militarized industrialization."

Early Foundations of HCI

Amid rising tensions over North Korea's armed infiltrations into South Korea in 1968, the US announced the Nixon Doctrine in 1969; this involved a planned withdrawal of US troops stationed in Asia, including South Korea. In response, Park declared his intentions to build a "self-reliant national defense" (*chaju kukpang*), while maintaining that economic and defense development must be mutual and interdependent pursuits (Taet'ongnyŏng pisŏsil 1970, 28). He promoted this design with the catchphrase "rich nation, strong military" (*puguk kangbyŏng*). In Park's view, the independent armament of South Korea would require industrial foundations that were integrated with an independent economy (*charip kyŏngje* or *chaju kyŏngje*) (*Tonga ilbo* 1971b) and total civilian support, especially from private businesses as the drivers of industrialization and the economy. Park devised the strategy to achieve these ends amid increasing economic rivalry with North Korea's leader Kim Il Sung (r. 1948–94), whose "Pyŏngjin [side-by-side] Line" policy had begun in 1962, with a dual advancement of industrialization and military

[1]Included are declassified presidential documents now available in the Presidential Archives of the National Archives of Korea, corporate data from major defense corporations, and oral data from my own interviews with former policymakers and skilled workers involved in the defense industry in the 1970s.

[2]Based on Chalmers Johnson's 1982 work on Japan's industrialization of the 1950s and 1960s, the developmental state model is regarded as the prototype of NICs in Asia in the postwar era.

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modernization (Chŏng 2012, 151). By the late 1960s, not only was North Korea more industrially advanced than South Korea, but the former had also established its own munitions plants capable of outfitting the North Korean military with domestic weapons (Presidential Archives 1968).

In South Korea, state-owned munitions plants were deemed unaffordable and impossible to build from scratch, especially given reduced US military aid to South Korea in the late 1960s. While the 1966 US-ROK agreement (the Brown Memo) stipulated that the US would subsidize the ROK's five-year military modernization plan (1966–71) in exchange for Park's dispatch of ROK troops to Vietnam, US delays and failures to deliver the promised aid stalled South Korea's military modernization efforts (see Presidential Archives 1970b). In April 1968, in response to escalating threats by North Korea, Park established a special operation of 2.5 million reserve troops, otherwise known as the Homeland Reserve Forces. In the same year, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) implemented a three-year plan (1968–71) that leveraged local civilian plant production of basic arms for the newly created reserve forces, but on a limited scale (*Tonga ilbo* 1968).

When the US, in accord with the Nixon Doctrine, then began withdrawing the 7th Infantry Division from South Korea in 1971, Park felt greater urgency to build South Korea's independent defense industry. The Nixon administration announced further plans for the eventual, full withdrawal of US troops by 1976, leaving the Park regime with less than five years to develop its own defense capabilities (O 1996a, 38). In November 1971, Park promoted O Wŏnch'ŏl, then-assistant vice-minister in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, to head the Second Economic Secretariat (Kyŏngje che 2 pisŏsil, or SES) in the Blue House and charged him with overseeing the development of an independent defense industry. As a technocrat and engineer by training, O outlined the HCIP, which focused on the rapid development of select civilian industries for the mass production of weapons (O 2009, 132–35).[3] This strategy distinguished South Korea from other East Asian NICs of the 1970s, inasmuch as the latter prioritized economic growth over military strengthening. South Korea also differed from neighboring North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union, which all built and ran national munitions plants as state projects rather than as private-sector enterprises.

Despite Nixon's promise to provide US $1.5 billion for the ROK's second five-year military modernization plan (1971–76) as compensation for the US withdrawal of troops in Korea, US military aid dwindled, beginning at least as early as 1972 (Presidential Archives 1972a). Under the duress caused by US reneging and North Korean aggression, the ROK government accelerated defense industry plans in 1972 with three events. First, in April, the Agency for Defense Development (ADD), South Korea's central institute for weapons R&D, impressively exhibited new, Korean-made basic weapons. Park responded by officially approving the HCIP for mass producing domestic weapons. Second, in October, Park's Defense Industry Promotion Council set HCI policy measures to integrate select businesses into a defense production system (O 1996a, 189). The *chaebŏl* were selected over smaller enterprises, based on proven business management, precision manufacturing abilities, and capacities for mass production, which would

[3]This plan fully expanded on an earlier three-year plan by the MND to localize arms production at existing civilian factories.

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minimize the time it would take to begin weapons production. Third, in the same month, Park declared the Yusin system, which constitutionally granted the president unlimited political power and gave his SES technocrats full control over industrial policies. With these three key events, the stage was set for Park's promulgation of HCI—or defense industry development—as national policy in January 1973.

The State-Led Merger of *Chaebŏl* with the Defense Industry

On January 12, 1973, the president publicly announced the HCIP, which included the state's strategy for concentrating investments in select heavy and chemical industries and the development of a highly skilled workforce. The ostensible and publicly promoted goal of the plan was to expedite national economic growth and increase exportation (Tae-t'ongnyŏng pisŏsil 1973, 58–59). As Park endeavored to conceal arms development from Washington, which regarded his weapons programs as threatening to Nixon's policy of *détente* with China, Park and his technocrats never publicly linked the HCIP with the defense industry.[4] However, declassified government documents on the defense industry supply many details of interoperable processes that were at work between the military and commercial production within HCI industries (Presidential Archives 1974a). To overcome a lack of the resources required for establishing a viable defense industry, Park's technocrats designed HCI on the basis of dual-purpose industries that would support interdependent and parallel development of the economy (including exports) and the defense industry (O 2009, 249–54), primarily to fulfill Park's priority of equipping the Korean troops with Korean-made arms.

The HCIP supported the development of Korean arms production in the following ways. First, the HCIP employed sector-specific strategies for development, with a focus on defense-related civilian industries in heavy machinery, shipbuilding, chemicals/petrochemicals, electronics, and special metals, along with a state-run steel industry (see Kyŏngje-2 1973). Second, plans included building large industrial complexes in these industries (Kyŏngje-2 1973, 15, 28) with the goal of enabling the mass production of domestic weapons. Low-cost mass production by private manufacturers would undergird the defense industry's progress toward export-oriented industrialization (Presidential Archives 1972b). In turn, an exporting industry would increase domestic defense product competitiveness and quality at international levels, which would feed back to boost overall economic development (O 2009, 135). Third, through state subsidies for technical high schools and vocational training, the HCIP promoted the rapid development of a technical workforce, especially in areas critical to the defense industry, including precision manufacturing (Kyŏngje-2 1973, 21). Fourth, and central to the strategy, the HCIP planned a sophisticated system of collaboration between the state and the private sector through special legal and institutional mechanisms, along with public funding to assist in integrating the *chaebŏl* with the public sector (Kyŏngje-2 1973, 31). In effect, the coordination fostered an industrial environment that favored business participation in nationalized defense development.

Despite the HCIP's design for merging the military with private-sector business, many corporate executives, being unfamiliar with the defense industry and seeing it as

[4]Kim Kwangmo, interview with the author, Map'o, South Korea, June 13, 2017.

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a high-risk venture, were reluctant to join the nascent program (Kim Kwangmo 2015, 157–58).[5] Because US arms controls limited transfers of advanced weapons technology to South Korea, Korean industries also lacked independent capacities for manufacturing the new weapons that the government required. Notwithstanding these limitations, the HCIP in the 1970s sought an all-out domestic mass production of arms based on a strong private sector functioning at the core of a military-industrial complex; the state required the total commitment of the *chaebŏl* as loyal, risk-taking, and proactive developers of a new industry.

In February 1973, new legislation, called the "Law on Special Measures for Procurement of Military Supplies" (*Kunsu chodal e kwanhan t'ŭkpyŏl choch'ibŏp*), abbreviated hereon as "Military Procurement Law" (MPL), was passed; it ultimately transformed business priorities, spurred private-public-sector cooperation, and incentivized heavy private-sector investment in the defense industry. Revised in 1977 and then further revised in 1979, the MPL provided the legal architecture through which the state induced and, at times, coerced selected *chaebŏl* to become defense manufacturers. Since the businesses that qualified as defense contractors also operated in HCI sectors, the law covered both defense- and HCI-related businesses.

For contracted *chaebŏl*, the MPL authorized unlimited state support of business development for weapons production and incentivized full participation and growth. Businesses received rebates, stipends, loans, and tax cuts, as well as funding for procurement of facilities and raw resources (Han'guk pangwi sanŏp chinhŭnghoe 1988, 62). In addition, the MPL offered technological aid, which included ADD assistance with R&D, as well as transfers of foreign weapons technologies and technical aid for contractors (see, for example, Presidential Archives 1976d). Other privileges of the MPL extended to skilled workers in the defense industry, who received not only rewards for good performance but also exemptions from the military service that was compulsory for all Korean men.

Legalized coercion guaranteed the full cooperation of *chaebŏl*. Heavy fines for noncompliance (Shaw 1984, 8) pressured *chaebŏl* to join Park's weapons projects, and all viable hold-out companies that resisted after the MPL, such as Samsung and Kia Motors, ultimately relented under direct presidential pressure (Kia chunggongŏp 1999, 85; O 1996b, 377). MPL regulations then compelled the newly contracted businesses to maximize their efforts to meet state-set quotas and quality standards at all costs. The MPL subjected defense businesses to disciplines that were harsher than what other industries faced when they underperformed or mismanaged resources. It furthermore authorized state surveillance of all aspects of defense factory operations (Han'guk pangwi sanŏp chinhŭnghoe 1988, 292).

The most significant impact of the MPL was the unlimited authority this legislation granted the president on all major decisions related to defense businesses. Since most of the *chaebŏl* had become defense (HCI) contractors by 1974, Park had sway over the entire private sector through the MPL, to a degree that distressed many legislators (*Tonga ilbo* 1977b). Much like the commander-in-chief of a major military operation

[5]Even when the MND first recruited businesses to small-scale arms production in the late 1960s, the government had to invoke the president's name to gain compliance with the preferential defense assignments (Hwang 2011, 247).

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who disciplines and orders troops under his command, Park shaped the structure and the culture of HCI with his own militaristic approach. His experience as a cadet in the military academy of Imperial Japan during the 1940s, and further as a major general in the ROK Army up to the *coup d'état* that he led in 1961, certainly informed his regime's militarized developmental policies (see Eckert 2016, 6). Accordingly, the HCI prioritized absolute efficiency, secrecy, and minimal delays, and Park's "HCI Planning Corps," which functioned as his "task force" under the SES, exercised authority over all processes of HCI operations to support the defense industry. Furthermore, the HCI Planning Corps dubbed itself the "Industrial Corps" (*sanŏp kundan*), suggesting an image of soldiers engaged in an industrial war against the communist North (H. Kim 2004, 180). This militarization permeated the *chaebŏl* executive offices, factories, and labor force, and these businesses operated like an infantry division in Park's march towards industrialization and national defense at all costs.

The Korean model of economic development was thus begotten of the state's push to build a self-sufficient defense industry through the radical militarization of Korean industries. MPL incentives and coercion bound defense contracts and contractors to state support for commercial production (HCI), as the *chaebŏl* became weapons producers. This system of "militarized industrialization" drove the state, the business sector, and labor to approach national development with a warlike sense of mission and fervor.

Yet, the state was not the sole factor orchestrating unprecedented convergences between the public and private sectors for military modernization. Other influences led the *chaebŏl* from reluctant participation in Park's self-reliant national defense program into service as his powerful allies. Pyŏngyang's militant "adventurism" in the late 1960s (Schaefer 2004), which included an attempt to assassinate Park in the Blue House and the abduction of the *USS Pueblo* in 1968, alarmed not only Park but also the wider public and private spheres of society and business. By the mid-1970s, North Korea was spending a quarter of its annual GNP on the military; by comparison, South Korea spent 5.1 percent of its GNP on national defense in 1975 (Kukpangbu 2002, 392, 394). Amid North Korea's ongoing threats, the general public in the 1970s, including Park's political opponents, feared the impending US troop withdrawals.[6] In reaction, Park mobilized national support for his plans to develop the defense industry and, throughout the 1970s, *chaebŏl* promoted Park's goals amid nationalistic fervor.[7] The following story of Hanwha, one of the first arms producers contracted through the MPL, offers a case study that illustrates how the *chaebŏl* conformed to the national agenda, while they simultaneously emerged as commercially and militarily driven forces in building a defense industry according to the HCIP.

[6]The dual threats of North Korean aggression and US troop withdrawals were dire enough that eventually even Park's political opponents—including Lee Chul Seung, the chairman of the New Democratic Party—joined Park's desperate attempts to persuade the US to reverse its policy (see Jimmy Carter Library 1977).

[7]By 1970, following on the heels of the 1968 crisis with North Korea, Park had gained full ministerial and military support to expand civilian participation in national security affairs and domestic arms production (see Presidential Archives 1970a).

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From Conscription to Cooperation: The Case of Hanwha

Founded by Kim Chonghŭi (1922–81) in October 1952, during the Korean War (1950–53), Han'guk hwayak (later called Hanwha) was South Korea's first manufacturer of domestic explosives in 1955 and became nationally renowned for pioneering the production of dynamite in 1958. After the war, Kim dedicated his business to South Korea's economic reconstruction, a vow encapsulated in his motto, "*Hwayak sanŏp ŭl t'onghan saŏp poguk*," or "repaying the nation through the explosives business" (Hanwha Inch'ŏn kongjang 2005, 52).[8] Kim's economic nationalism resonated with the mindsets of other corporate leaders of his generation, many of whom had experienced Japanese colonization (1910–45), the devastation of the civil war, and ensuing national poverty. These entrepreneurs, who viewed "constructive entrepreneurial acts as patriotic" (C. S. Kim 1996, 52), sought business opportunities through the indigenized development of new products and skills that could be useful for the nation. So, by the 1960s, when Park Chung Hee came to power, entrepreneurs like Kim had already displayed at least some cultural receptivity to nationalistic ideals.

In October 1972, three months prior to official promulgation of HCI policy, the government designated Hanwha one of its first twenty-nine contractors for the state's new HCI-based defense program (O 1996a, 189–90). At this time, the company had expertise only in producing commercial explosives, with insufficient capabilities for producing military explosives. Nonetheless, a contract refusal would jeopardize Hanwha's solvency while also threatening future relations with the state. Like most other *chaebŏl*, Hanwha had relied on state contracts and capital through its long partnership with the Park regime since Park's first and second Five-Year Economic Development Plans (1962–66 and 1967–71), so by 1972, the company depended heavily on state support for business operations. As further pressure, in October 1972, the same month that Hanwha and the first group of defense contractors were selected, Park instituted the Yusin system, which, through the nationalization of banks and capital, made it even more risky for *chaebŏl* to opt out.

By seizing incentives, Hanwha and other defense contractors gained unprecedented state financial, technological, and resource assistance, upon implementation of the MPL in 1973 (*Maeil kyŏngje* 1973). Along with these benefits, Kim Chonghŭi saw Hanwha's participation in national weapons production as patriotic and thus a way to build a good reputation for the company. In compliance with the MPL in the 1970s, then, Hanwha's factory in the city of Inch'ŏn, like other defense plants, enforced the state's goals for indigenized production and increased exports, transforming both the corporate structure and ideology to realize Park's plan for a defense industry. In these ways and others discussed below, Hanwha's story illustrates the policies, corporate culture, and work environments that shaped the first generation of Korean defense corporations.[9]

[8]During this time, the saying "*saŏp poguk*" (through business, repay the nation) was widely used among notable *chaebŏl* leaders, such as Chŏng Chuyŏng (Hyundai) and Yi Pyŏngch'ŏl (Samsung).
[9]The weight of defense production in the overall business mix differed from corporation to corporation. However, with high-level control exercised by the state over the private sector under the MPL, the state succeeded in conforming contracting businesses to Park's agenda; thus the

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Indigenized Production

Once contracted, whether pressured by risks or motivated by potential profits and nationalism, Kim Chonghŭi, like other *chaebŏl* executives, quickly adopted Park's official priority of "indigenizing" (*kuksanhwa*) defense (HCI) production for establishing a self-reliant national defense (*Kyŏnghyang sinmun* 1973b; Taet'ongnyŏng pisŏsil 1977, 166, 174). Hanwha stood to gain prestige the more it operated as one of the government's exclusive defense corporations, or "*pangsanŏp*," which were hailed by the state and the public for serving national security needs (*Tonga ilbo* 1977a). As the nation's lone supplier of explosives up until the 1970s, Hanwha played a crucial role in the defense industry and cultivated an internal culture devoted to the national quest for building a self-reliant national defense (Hanwha kŭrup 2002, 75). Imbued with the nationalist ethos of his day, Kim Chonghŭi—like other corporate heads of major defense contractors, such as Chŏng Chuyŏng of Hyundai and Ryu Ch'anu of Poongsan—adopted Park's "*chaju kukpang*" as Hanwha's corporate mission (*Kyŏnghyang sinmun* 1977; *Tonga ilbo* 1977a).

Kim implemented Park's priorities at Hanwha's flagship factory in Inch'ŏn. As a manufacturer of both HCI and defense products after 1973, the factory management and workers pursued "*hwayak chagŭp chajok*" (self-sufficiency in explosives production) as the company's high calling (Hanwha Inch'ŏn kongjang 2005, 16). According to Mr. Min, who began his career as a chemical specialist at the Inch'ŏn factory in the 1970s, the pursuit to indigenize explosives was deeply ingrained—it was "second-nature"—in the minds of Inch'ŏn factory managers and workers alike.[10] The Inch'ŏn factory, after all, was the nation's first and only domestic supplier of explosives, which only strengthened the resolve of workers to produce everything for explosives, from the most basic ingredients to complete products. Since US arms policies continued to restrict foreign technical aid for South Korean manufacturing of military explosives, employees had to work from the ground up to acquire technology for a new type of explosive. Overall, as Min recalled, workers labored with the conviction, "If we don't produce explosives, nobody else can."[11]

The race to the end goals, however, met with hurdles from the beginning. As previously mentioned, the Inch'ŏn factory itself, which was originally built to manufacture commercial explosives, was not equipped to handle the advanced experiments required for high explosives for military use. The Inch'ŏn factory's chemical specialists also lacked formal training and expertise in military production, and they had to strain to develop independent technology. With state subsidies and technical support, Hanwha began building specialized facilities for military explosives, while acquiring R&D assistance from the ADD (Presidential Archives 1974b; see also Hanwha kŭrup 2002, 42). According to Mr. Lee, a top Hanwha chemical engineer deeply involved with Inch'ŏn

general mold of successful companies was similar, as they catered to state demands in order to survive and excel.

[10]Min, a chemical specialist at Hanwha from the 1970s to 2000s, interview with the author, Inch'ŏn, South Korea, November 14, 2012. Full name undisclosed to protect privacy.

[11]*Ibid.*

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throughout the 1970s, when the conditions of US military aid prevented access to full weapons blueprints, Hanwha resorted to "reverse engineering" methods to build military products, and not always with success.[12] The Inch'ŏn factory's special division, named "Production Team 2," oversaw the experimentation and development of military explosives and worked closely with ADD scientists to create blueprints to indigenize the production (Hanwha Inch'ŏn kongjang 2005, 158). Through these efforts, Hanwha began producing basic high explosives by June 1973 (183). Production Team 2's activities were highly classified. Even within the company, other departments were not privy to the team's work, and its projects with the ADD operated under state surveillance with strict regulations to prevent team researchers from leaking information.[13]

Security

For defense plants like the Inch'ŏn factory, MPL surveillance measures operated continuously to ensure that explosives and technologies did not fall into the wrong hands.[14] North Korea increased industrial espionage in South Korea after the start of the HCI in 1973, and some employees of major manufacturers, including Kia, Poongsan, and Hanwha, were caught spying for North Korea (*Kyŏnghyang sinmun* 1973a; *Tonga ilbo* 1973b). As the Park government intensified anti-spy policies in defense plants, strict security became a daily feature of the lives of defense industry workers. According to Yu Hansik, a former Kia technician who participated in the development of a missile launch pad in the 1970s, "Everything [in the defense industry] was classified during this period." Information was tightly controlled; even within a single company, "every worker was assigned different task and role, and we often didn't even know what each other was making."[15]

Physical enforcement of security was conspicuous throughout the factory. Enlisted soldiers from the military, special police officers, and company security personnel constantly guarded the entrances and facilities at Inch'ŏn (see figure 1).[16] Security personnel conducted full-body searches of workers leaving the workplace, to ensure that no explosive material or equipment left the factory (Hanwha Inch'ŏn kongjang 2005, 88). Additionally, the company installed sensor equipment at entrances and surrounding the factory along barbed wire fences. All applicants seeking work at the Inch'ŏn factory had to pass police background checks, and no one suspected of collaborating with North Korea as spies, or anyone having any record of close family ties to communists, would be admitted (84).

Additional procedures were internally driven by the company management to guarantee worker safety while also meeting the state's ever-increasing militaristic regulations

[12]Lee, a chemical engineer at Hanwha from the late 1960s to the 1980s, interview with the author, Seoul, South Korea, August 11, 2017. Full name undisclosed to protect privacy.
[13]*Ibid.*
[14]Min, a chemical specialist at Hanwha from the 1970s to 2000s, interview with the author, Inch'ŏn, South Korea, March 13, 2014. Full name undisclosed to protect privacy. See also Hanwha kŭrup (2002, 42).
[15]Yu Hansik, former technician in Kia Heavy Industries in the 1970s, interview with the author, Ch'angwŏn, South Korea, June 27, 2013.
[16]Min interview, *op. cit.* note 14.

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Figure 1. Inch'ŏn factory gate, 1977 (Min 2011, 218, photo no. 1250).

under the MPL.[17] Company records indicate that, beginning in the 1960s, dangerous experiments with explosives at the Inch'ŏn factory often caused accidents, and these tragedies only continued with Hanwha's production of new military explosives throughout the 1970s (Hanwha Inch'ŏn kongjang 2005, 96–97). In labs that experimented with military explosives—where the slightest technical misstep, even mismanagement of humidity levels, might lead to a catastrophic malfunction—a guiding maxim was "first safety, second safety, third safety."[18]

Worker sacrifices occurred continually behind the scenes inside other defense factories as well, as workers regularly conducted hazardous experiments.[19] Mr. Kang, a chemical specialist serving Poongsan Corporation in An'gang, Northern Kyŏngsang Province, in the late 1970s, stated the following: "I was sometimes treated not as human but more like a dog in that working environment." According to Kang, an authoritarian hierarchy was in charge, and workers like himself had to silently endure inhumane working conditions and indignities: "I was often persecuted under the militaristic policies in the factory."[20] Kang, like other workers, bore such hardships, though he entered the

[17]Lee interview, *op. cit.* note 12; see also Hanwha kŭrup (2002, 119).
[18]Lee, a chemical engineer at Hanwha from the late 1960s to the 1980s, interview with the author, Seoul, South Korea, June 28, 2018. Full name undisclosed to protect privacy.
[19]Kang, a Poongsan skilled worker in the 1970s, interview with the author, An'gang, South Korea, November 27, 2012. Full name undisclosed to protect privacy.
[20]*Ibid.*

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An'gang factory as a highly skilled worker with a second-level technical license and a military exemption.[21]

Militarization of Work Culture

The Inch'ŏn factory operated according to militaristic (*kundaesik*) structure and chain of command, as rank-ordered workers answered to a rigid hierarchy and complied with strict disciplinary rules and protocols to prevent accidents or disorder.[22] Aside from safety issues, the creation of the "workplace reserve troops" (*chikchang yebigun*) as part of the newly established Homeland Reserve Forces in 1968 required Korean workers to guard their worksites as civilian reserves; this requirement intensified the militarization of the Inch'ŏn factory (Kungnip yŏnghwa chejakso 1968). Former employees recall that factory workers fully adopted militaristic customs and rules in their daily work in the 1970s even regularly exchanging military-style salutes.[23] O Chaedŏk, a former vice president of Hanwha, has described the environment as follows:

> It was a factory that involved many dangers, and since the enemies [North Korean infiltrators] could easily target it, we were regularly trained extensively to prepare against their intrusions. Even policemen and media personnel were not allowed access to the factory. The guards barred their entry, and they had to turn back and leave. Therefore, at the time, many thought that Inch'ŏn factory was operated by the government (Hanwha Inch'ŏn kongjang 2005, 90).

In this security setting, amid experiments with explosive materials, factory workers strictly complied with exacting codes to minimize risks while operating with maximum efficiency. Management aggressively implemented measures to enforce established safety protocols. Worksites and labs within the factory were plastered with safety rules, warnings, and instructions to bolster the attentiveness, discipline, and vigilance of workers (Min 2011, 104–5; see figure 2). Every day, all factory workers were required to recite the factory's official "Oath of Safety" in unison before starting work (330). On other occasions, workers sang militaristic company songs for morale and safety, like infantry readying themselves for a mission.[24]

To strictly uphold safety codes and to protect military products, the factory trained its own "safety guards" (Hanwha Inch'ŏn kongjang 2005, 89), who wore military uniforms and enforced rules (see figure 3). Persons and R&D teams who were proven to avoid accidents and thus protect safety over time (for example, 120 days), earned company medals reminiscent of military medals (Min 2011, 330–31; see figure 4). In fact, military-style ceremonies, drills, and other group exercises were customary features of factory culture throughout the 1970s (see figures 5 and 6). Ordinary workers also wore uniforms and hats designating their positions and gender (Min 2011, 38, 41, 332–35).

[21]A second-level license was issued to those highly skilled workers who graduated from technical high schools and then passed the National Technical Qualification Test (introduced in July 1974).
[22]Lee interview, *op. cit.* note 12.
[23]Lee interview, *op. cit.* note 12; see also Hanwha Inch'ŏn kongjang (2005, 17).
[24]Min interview, *op. cit.* note 10.

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Figure 2. Safety signs on factory equipment in the 1970s (Min 2011, 160, photo no. 862).

Figure 3. Inch'ŏn factory safety guards (*anjŏn yowŏn*) in the 1970s (Min 2011, 331, photo no. 2021).

Yi Kyubyŏng, another worker at the Inch'ŏn factory in the 1970s, commented on the factory's atmosphere as follows: "Getting employed at Inch'ŏn factory was like re-entering the military service" (Hanwha Inch'ŏn kongjang 2005, 87). Rigid hierarchy determined the protocols of all interactions between superiors and subordinates in the division of labor, seniors and juniors, and between genders. According to Kim Yunsik, former chair of the labor union at Inch'ŏn factory in the 1970s, blue-collar workers were demarcated from the managerial class by separate uniforms and dormitories; only white-collar workers had access to the dining hall, whereas laborers brought food from home and often ate at their work sites (Hanwha Inch'ŏn kongjang 2005, 83–85). There was also a vast disparity in wages between management and labor; furthermore, only white-collar positions received bonuses, whereas blue-collar wage levels were stagnant. Overall, a militaristic system in all factory activities and relationships enforced strict discipline, safety,

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

Figure 4. "Safety medal" ceremony at Inch'ŏn factory, 1977 (Min 2011, 330, photo no. 2019 [photo a] and photo no. 2020 [photo b]).

and efficiency; tension and intimidation were normal aspects of work to maintain the factory's pace.[25]

In his efforts to defuse conflicts between businesses and labor, Park implemented the Factory New Village Movement (*Kongjang saemaŭl undong*) in the 1970s to encourage the company loyalty of all workers. In speeches, Park frequently employed traditional Confucian metaphors of family to promote unity between business owners and employees (*Tonga ilbo* 1979). Nevertheless, as the *chaebŏl* conformed themselves to Park's expansionist strategy to increase exports from the mid to late 1970s, labor was strictly controlled to achieve maximum output at minimum costs. MPL regulations outlawed

[25]Min interview, *op. cit.* note 10; see also Hanwha Inch'ŏn kongjang (2005, 88–89).

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Figure 5. Military-style "meritorious persons" awards (*anjŏn yugongja*) at Inch'ŏn factory, 1977 (Min 2011, 331, photo no. 2025).

Figure 6. Inch'ŏn factory workers in the 1970s (Min 2011, 330, photo no. 2017).

collective action by labor in defense factories (Han'guk pangwi sanŏp chinhŭnghoe 1988, 292). Often, workers endured harsh working conditions and violations of civil rights, as both the state and businesses restricted wage levels and welfare standards.

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The militarism of industrial sites intensified throughout the 1970s, amid South Korea's increasing economic competition with the North. To invigorate worker allegiance to HCI policy after 1973, the state's anti-communist propaganda fostered a warlike mentality among industrial workers, particularly in defense plants such as Inch'ŏn.[26] Park and the state media identified factory workers as *sanŏp chŏnsa*, or "industrial soldiers," and promoted their working environments as sites of the nation's industrial warfare against the North (*Tonga ilbo* 1973a). Park's propaganda mirrored North Korea's *Ch'ŏllima* Movement, a mass mobilization of labor for rapid industrialization, which also elevated industrial workers to the status of "labor heroes," while celebrating factory work as central to the state's national defense and economic strengthening (C. H. Kim 2018, 44, 107).

Joining Park's campaign, Inch'ŏn factory managers purveyed and exhibited popular anti-communist and warlike slogans, such as *pukchin t'ongil* (marching forward to the North for reunification) and *myŏlgong t'ongil* (reunification through the destruction of communism) (*Tonga ilbo* 1971a, 1978). As figure 1 shows, in 1977 the topmost sign above the Inch'ŏn factory's gate displayed a popular slogan, "*hanson ŭro saengsan, hanson ŭro chŏnt'u*" (production in one hand, battle in the other). Similar messages reverberated throughout society, but were especially pronounced in HCI factories, including Inch'ŏn, where the loyalty of workers was most critically needed to support the state's cause. Militarism requiring sacrificial allegiance persisted within Hanwha's expansion beyond the 1970s. A new post erected in the Inch'ŏn factory in the 1990s was inscribed with the words of the famous Korean naval commander Yi Sunsin (1545–98): "*p'ilsa chŭksaeng p'ilsaeng chŭksa*," or "If you are ready to die, you will live; if you try to live, you will die" (see figure 7).

Losses and Failures

Through rapid industrial and cultural transformation in response to state policies, Hanwha developed as a prominent arms producer for Yulgok Operation (1974–81), Park's independent military modernization program to develop advanced weapons banned by the US.[27] Under Yulgok, Hanwha's primary task was to produce smokeless powder, the basic gunpowder used in ammunition for M-1 rifles and carbines. This material was indispensable for supplying the Homeland Reserve Force troops with Korean-made ammunition (Presidential Archives 1976a). However, indigenizing advanced military gunpowder, such as smokeless powder, was not a cost-effective venture for a new arms producer like Hanwha, and it required the company to take risks and make sacrifices. To meet government goals, Hanwha invested corporate capital beyond state subsidies to develop smokeless powder along with other new military products (*Maeil kyŏngje* 1977). By doing so, the company absorbed losses through investments in R&D, experimental production, and numerous failed trials.[28] In fact, despite

[26]Min interview, *op. cit.* note 10.
[27]On March 15th, 1974, Park officially launched the "1st Force Improvement Plan" (1974–81), which was the MND alias for the classified Yulgok Operation.
[28]Lee interview, *op. cit.* note 12.

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Figure 7. Post in front of Inch'ŏn factory in the 1990s (Min 2011, 281, photo no. 1720).

costly attempts, Hanwha failed to produce smokeless powder independently throughout 1974, due to technical limitations (Hanwha kŭrup 2002, 74).

Hanwha's struggles escalated as other profit-driven businesses gained experience and competed for the lucrative defense contracts under the MPL, even challenging Hanwha's long-held monopoly over gunpowder production. From 1974 to 1975, Hanwha competed fiercely with ammunition producer Poongsan for the exclusive license to produce ball powder for M-16 ammunition, a contract that included substantial state funding and a transfer of US technical support for a new factory (Presidential Archives 1975a). Through heavy investments to develop a superior prototype of domestic ball powder, both companies took enormous risks. When the government selected Poongsan as the contractor in 1975, the lost bid was especially demoralizing for Hanwha, since the latter had supplied all domestic explosives products since the company's founding in the 1950s.

As Hanwha competed for additional contracts to produce ammunition and other military products, the company also leveled charges against the contracting agency of the government. In June 1976, after a relatively new defense producer, Sinil Metal Corporation, won the contract for the navy's training shells, Hanwha, along with Han'guk Machinery and Kia Heavy Industries, filed public complaints against the MND, charging that the MND and Sinil had made illicit deals (Presidential Archives 1976b). Hanwha and the other manufacturers of training shells were incensed that Sinil had been selected by the MND multiple times for similar ammunition contracts, despite the company's lack of experience in defense production. The plaintiff companies alleged that personal ties with Sinil led the MND to favor Sinil over more highly qualified producers.

Meanwhile, Hanwha, in an effort to avoid further losing its share in the gunpowder industry, collaborated with foreign firms from 1975 to 1976 on the construction of a second plant that would specialize in military gunpowder, including smokeless powder (Presidential Archives 1976a; Hanwha kŭrup 2002, 75, 160). The new joint venture

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was closely coordinated with the government, which provided the loans to Hanwha and chose Yŏsu in South Chŏlla Province as the site for the new plant. Notwithstanding state involvement, Hanwha's own management, especially Vice President Sin Hyŏn'gi, Kim Chonghŭi's trusted executive, led the international efforts between Hanwha and companies from the US, France, Canada, and Japan to procure the transfer of necessary technologies and facilities. By this time, the new Gerald Ford administration (1974–77) had started to offer more US cooperation with South Korea's weapons programs, as other foreign competitors had challenged the American monopoly in Korea's defense market under the US-ROK Foreign Military Sales program (Kwon 2016, 251). However, since the US would grant only partial technological assistance in any deal, Hanwha aggressively pursued technologies from multiple suppliers through independent ventures. For example, Hanwha organized expeditions of chemists and engineers who spent long periods abroad learning directly from renowned foreign producers how to manufacture new military explosives.[29] Through these efforts, and with completion of the Yŏsu plant in 1978, Hanwha began mass-producing smokeless powder and other basic materials for military explosives, thus regaining competitive advantage in gunpowder production.

Like Hanwha and Poongsan, other defense manufacturers pushed each other through sustained and fierce competition to achieve Park's defense aims. By the above means, as well as by investing to enlarge the supply of skilled workers (Presidential Archives 1976c) and by privately donating to support national defense (*Tonga ilbo* 1974), Hanwha and other *chaebŏl* actively promoted Park's goals; in so doing, they became his strongest supporters for defense industrialization throughout the 1970s.

Conglomeration of *Chaebŏl*

Morphing from an industrial explosives company to a weapons manufacturer under HCI, Hanwha not only strengthened its comparative advantage in explosives but also diversified its industrial products and exports. Through participation in HCI in the 1970s and with the state's generous aid under the MPL, Hanwha, along with *chaebŏl* in general, developed an "octopus-like" reach across multiple sectors, with indigenized, advanced R&D; state-of-the-art facilities; and a highly skilled workforce for defense production. Hanwha, which had, up to the 1960s, specialized in chemical and petrochemical products, accelerated diversification into unrelated sectors to include manufacturing, construction, transportation, finance, and shipping, and even a fully expanded division of petrochemical products. Factory automation and mass production capabilities opened further doors for Hanwha to grow as a major exporter.

Similarly, Hyundai rapidly diversified into automobile, shipbuilding, and steel industries in the 1970s, during which time the company also became a defense contractor (E. Kim and Park 2011, 286). Even the young company Daewoo rapidly rose as a top *chaebŏl* after it joined the defense industry in the 1970s. After finally joining as a defense contractor in the late 1970s, Samsung quickly acquired technology to produce products for the aerospace and shipbuilding industries. Like these and other defense contractors that enlisted in Park's program in the 1970s, Hanwha became a leading industrial

[29] *Ibid.*

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conglomerate by propelling South Korea's defense production and economic growth. The transformation of Hanwha and other *chaebŏl* to function as dual-purpose producers for both national defense and the nation's market economy is one of the Park state's most significant legacies: military modernization with and through militarized industrialization.

Only the most enterprising businesses found ways to manage challenges in the rapid-pace environment and the system of rewards and punishments (Amsden 1989). Over time, these "strong businesses" exerted proactive, profit-motivated, and entrepreneurial efforts that expanded industry in the service of Park's vision to develop a self-reliant national defense. As Eun Mee Kim and Gil Sung Park (2011, 294) claim, the *chaebŏl* of the Park era were "dynamic players, sometimes following Park, other times leading the state, and still other times partnering with multinationals rather than with the state in their search for corporate growth." Hanwha was one such corporation, and it displayed the dynamic interplay of compliance and initiative of other *chaebŏl* as they likewise responded to state orders and then pushed to build up the defense industry. The result was neither a totally state-mandated nor a strictly market-led defense industry. Rather, in South Korea, a unique military-industrial complex emerged, driven by the agency of militarized *chaebŏl*, which MPL policies had drastically reshaped to accomplish state ends.

Intertwined with military production in all corporate activities by the MPL, and operating at the nexus of state directives and private markets, the *chaebŏl* operated as hybrid conglomerates, as the strengths of the private sector were leveraged to serve the state's military and economic aims. At the same time, as displayed by the Inch'ŏn factory, *chaebŏl* factories ran under constant government surveillance and functioned like public factories as they complied with Park's effort to indigenize and export HCI (defense) products while upholding militancy in their work environments. In this context, distinctions between public and private, state and nonstate, and government-owned or commercial properties were blurred.

By 1976, the ROK had established a system of mass production of basic arms, meeting the deadline set by the Nixon administration for the complete exit of US troops from Korea (a plan later cancelled). HCI plants also began taking advantage of export opportunities through the mass production of surplus weapons (Presidential Archives 1975b). From 1975 to 1982, South Korea emerged as the fifth largest arms exporter in the Third World, with a total value of trade amounting to US $1.28 billion (C. Moon 2015, 210). When the Jimmy Carter administration (1977–81) reignited the US push for a full withdrawal of American troops and for stronger arms restrictions in the late 1970s, the *chaebŏl*, under the direction of Yulgok Operation, rapidly expanded weapon types to include heavy artillery, surveillance equipment, armored vehicles, modified US tanks, helicopters, navy vessels, and key components of fighter jets and missile systems, among others (Kwon 2017, 225). The outcome was commensurate with Park's "self-reliance" (*chaju*) ideology, as civilian engagement was leveraged to pursue national self-reliance in both defense (*chaju kukpang*) and the economy (*chaju kyŏngje*).

A Variant Model of Development

Within comparative studies of economic models suited to describe the phenomenon of East Asian economic development, the ROK's defense-centered industrialization

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presents a distinctive model. First, defense industry development was the main impetus of South Korea's heavy and chemical industrialization in the 1970s, and this effort also catapulted the rapid development of the present-day *chaebŏl*. The way that the defense industry was designed to remain intertwined with economic development and exports in the 1970s reflected Park's proverbial emphasis on "rich nation, strong military." Second, the Park government employed independent strategies to achieve a system of intricate "public-private convergence" for military modernization. Defying US advice on laissez-faire economics, the Park state asserted *dirigiste* policies that were designed to drive the *chaebŏl*-led military modernization. Under Blue House auspices, the HCIP and the MPL expedited and melded private-sector capabilities and interests to serve the state's defense and economic aims. Throughout the 1970s, underlying all development of the Park state, militarism dominated Korean industries and determined the push for exportation and rapid economic development. At the peak of Cold War militarization—under the tight controls of Park's direct presidential guidance and amid an intense national push for arms production—entire *chaebŏl*, from management all the way down to labor, were remolded, in terms of both corporate structure and ideology, to serve the state's military goals. As implications of these outcomes, then, future work might consider how ROK development compared to the development of other emerging economies in the region and to that of other nations with private-public-sector systems.

Development in South Korea shared key traits with developmental processes in other East Asian states in the postwar era. The latter all instituted state-guided systems that induced market conformity; they all also adopted export-oriented strategies and solicited US support to engineer rapid growth. Many parallels can be observed between South Korea and Japan in particular. Park's campaign for "rich nation, strong military" harked back to the rallying cry of the modernization movement in Meiji Japan, "*fukoku kyōhei* 富國强兵" (also meaning "rich nation, strong military") during the late nineteenth century. Park's "self-reliance" policies for indigenously driven industrialization echoed Japan's wartime mobilization of industries (from the 1930s to 1945) to reduce dependence on the US and other Western sources. In drafting the HCIP, SES technocrats had studied Japan's export-led heavy and chemical industrialization under technocratic policymaking from 1957 to 1966 (K. Kim 2015, 58). Furthermore, Park's alliance with *chaebŏl* to develop technologies to serve both commercial and military purposes mirrored Japan's partnership with the *zaibatsu* (Samuels 1996, 140). However, development in the two countries differed in two significant ways: First, South Korea, threatened by US troop withdrawals, prioritized the military to a much greater extent than Japan did. Second, the latter enjoyed guaranteed US protections that the former did not.

Given the following further distinguishing characteristics, the ROK instance can be most precisely described as offering a "variant" example of—and certainly not a prime example of—a "developmental state." First, while other East Asian nations that are frequently designated as developmental states relied on government ministries—such as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan and the Industrial Development Bureau in Taiwan—for industrial policymaking, their heads of state were not as dominant in the process as was President Park. Park was exceptionally and thoroughly involved in all aspects of the private-sector development to completely mobilize *chaebŏl* as weapons producers in a highly condensed time frame. Japan, given the

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MITI system's preexisting institutional ties with the *zaibatsu*, required less "top-down," militaristic control for mobilization (Evans 1995, 52–53). In the case of Taiwan, there was much weaker public-private-sector cooperation than was the case with either Japan or Korea, as Taiwan was led by small and medium enterprises. As a further distinction, the Korean state tailored its development to "defense industry needs," whereas in the 1970s Taiwan and other NICs, as well as Japan, tailored industrialization to prioritize economic goals (Kwon 2018, 37; Nishino 2011, 204–5). The microeconomics of the Korean HCI were fundamentally different from development in other Asian developmental states, by virtue of the degree to which defense and HCI were fully intertwined for development that was also highly accelerated.

The unusually deep convergences between the state and *chaebŏl* in the urgent effort to strengthen defense also distinguished ROK economic development from development processes in the US, the ROK's patron, as well as in other countries characterized by advanced private-public-sector partnerships. While the HCI strategy for civilian defense manufacturing espoused a US-style privatization of defense, the ROK could not have fully replicated the US market-oriented approach to military modernization, due to both a lack of industrial foundations and the compressed time frame in which the ROK was forced to operate. Unlike US private-sector businesses, which already had infrastructure for high manufacturing output prior to their conversions as arms manufacturers in World War II, the Korean state engineered and developed a nascent private-sector transition into defense industry production within a five-year time frame, from 1971 to 1976, in consideration of the anticipated full withdrawal of US troops by 1976 (see O 1996a, 38). South Korea pursued a defense industry development plan that catered to its own deadlines and duress with its lack of resources, through a highly militarized push for private-public collaboration that in turn accelerated the development of convertible technologies for both economic and military purposes. The rate at which the HCI forged a total merger and synchronized development of the military, business, science, and labor, from 1973 through 1979—all to support military production in parallel with economic growth—was highly accelerated through the combined efforts of the assertive state and its proactive *chaebŏl* partners. The combined and totalizing efforts enabled Korea to "catch up" as a late defense industrializer.

The burgeoning weapons production and exportation of the 1970s came with heavy costs. Park exerted direct presidential guidance with tight control over all economic processes, and sudden, steep declines in production ensued with Park's demise. Because processes ran according to Park's personal influence and oversight, the entire industry suffered a loss of direction, stalled growth, and financial scandals throughout the 1980s, following Park's assassination in 1979. Concentrated procurement of US weapons technology, which began with Park and continued with later administrations, rendered the ROK dependent on the US for key defense technologies (C. Moon 2015, 208). Furthermore, due to concentrated investment in select *chaebŏl*, the supply chain for defense and HCI developed as an oligopoly, which proved detrimental to competition and growth in the long run. Most significant for Park's legacy, as state HCI policies prioritized security and development over democratic progress, equity and civil rights were impeded throughout and beyond the Park era. Park's critics have even suggested that Park exploited the security environment of the late 1960s to pave the way

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for his totalitarian rule (see Pak 2005, 148–49). Yet, other studies based on Korean, American, and Russian diplomatic archives suggest that the security threat posed by North Korea and the US Nixon Doctrine in the late 1960s, on which basis Park launched the HCI-led defense strategy in the 1970s, was real for both Park and ROK policymakers.[30]

Regardless of Park's motives, the historical record demonstrates that, given the security challenges Park faced in the 1970s, and while responding to US arms restrictions, the ROK overcame limits of time and resources to accomplish the total mobilization of industries that rapidly progressed to strengthen Korea, not only militarily but also economically. Park's totalizing pursuit of HCI throughout the 1970s competed fiercely with Kim Il Sung's similar industrial-military strategy for North Korea. Both regimes were driven to reduce their economic and military dependence on their patron states, each with its own version of "self-reliance" policy (*chaju* in South Korea; *chuch'e* in North Korea). However, whereas North Korea heavily invested in state-run military industries that proved deleterious to the economy, South Korea's investment in *chaebŏl* in the service of military modernization created profitable spinoffs in the private sector over the long run.

What emerged in South Korea under Park stands as a distinct model of "militarized industrialization," in which pressing security concerns led to militarization that in turn drove economic and industrial expansion, and vice versa; this dual development of defense and economy was propelled by the advanced civilian manufacturing by *chaebŏl*. The state provided a blueprint for industrial expansion; the *chaebŏl* realized the plans. South Korea's massive defense-centered industrialization occurred through the state's mobilization of privately owned *chaebŏl* equipped with a national workforce, through dynamics that forged the industrial and technological basis of the modern ROK economy. Although this observation risks fanning the flames of the polarizing debate that rages around Park's choice of developmental strategies, the historical record should account for how the ROK under Park built its own defense industry *ex nihilo* under HCI from 1973 to 1979. During Park's presidency, as South Korea's economy boomed, its national security system was also freed from total dependency on US military aid by virtue of the ROK's newly engineered, independent capacities for an indigenous production of arms. As a historic phenomenon, the process of military modernization through industrial revolution, along with unprecedented rates of economic growth, merits the attention of further scholarly inquiry, regardless of the values that undergirded it.

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[30]For example, studies based on declassified archival materials clearly reveal that the North Korean regime independently initiated the 1968 security crisis to escalate tensions in the Korean peninsula (see, e.g., Lerner 2002; Radchenko 2005; Ryu 2009; Schaefer 2004).

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